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1.  Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed both growing income inequality and persistently high
unemployment. In the United States and in the United Kingdom, the worsening prospects
have taken the form of decreases in the real earnings of lower-skilled workers – the real
hourly wages of young males with 12 or fewer years of schooling has dropped by more
than 20 percent in the last two decades. In continental Europe, real wages at the bottom of
the skill distribution have risen, but at the cost of significant increases in unemployment –
especially for this group (Freeman (1995), Machin and Van Reenen (1998)). Although
there have been competing explanations concerning the primary reasons behind these
phenomena, for some authors the increased pace of global economic integration
(popularly referred to as globalization) has had a major role to play  (see, for example,
Wood (1995) and Rodrik (1997)).
1 Moreover, in conjunction with the need for more
social insurance programs – which the increased exposure to globalization generates –
many authors fear that globalization (of capital markets in particular) erodes the ability of
the nation state to satisfy these needs. According to this view, governments will find it
increasingly difficult to raise revenue from the taxation of mobile factors of production.
As a result, redistribution and employment creation are viewed as initiatives that may be
increasingly difficult to pursue. 
These developments have stimulated renewed interest in policies that may redistribute
income in ways that minimize undesirable indirect effects. This is particularly so since
one of the usual charges made against the social welfare system is that in many countries
it nourishes a collectively sub-optimal incentive structure, ranging from excessive early
retirement to “poverty traps” for unemployed workers (especially single mothers) who3
return to low-wage employment. In many countries, the implicit tax rate at the low end of
the earnings distribution is often very large because of the phasing out of transfer
programs as income rises. For example, Atkinson and Sutherland (1990) report that in
Britain in 1989 almost half a million families faced marginal tax rates of 70 per cent or
higher, as a result of means-tested social assistance benefits. Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999) also provide an extensive analysis of marginal tax rates faced by low-income
households in the US and in the UK, and show that the implicit tax rate may sometimes
exceed 100% when two or more transfer programs are phased-out simultaneously.
Despite these costs, the welfare state can still have a net positive (efficiency enlarging)
effect in modern industrialized economies. Indeed, as Sinn (1995) and Atkinson (1999)
have persuasively argued, the welfare state should not be viewed as something that only
disturbs the market process. Especially in a second-best setting, it is something that can
encourage risk-taking, foster efficiency and facilitate the growth process.  
In this paper, we argue that the fears regarding globalization may be exaggerated. We
show that, in a second-best setting, even when taxing perfectly mobile factors,
governments can acquire the necessary revenue to facilitate policies that can both reduce
unemployment and increase the incomes of those already working. As a base for
comparison, we first examine a closed economy in which the source of the second best
lies in the labour market. The payment of efficiency wages by firms intent on maximizing
profits results in involuntary unemployment. Then, we focus our attention on small open-
economy framework.
Three policies are considered. The first involves the unconditional payment of a
guaranteed income to all citizens. The features that distinguish the Basic Income (BI)4
proposal – variously called “guaranteed annual income”, “universal basic income”, or
“demogrant” (see, Meade (1948, 1972), Tobin et al. (1967), Atkinson (1995), Van Parijs
(1995, 2000)) – from other social security proposals, are that it is paid irrespective of any
other income, it does not require any present or past work performance, it is not
conditional on the willingness to accept a job, and it is paid to individuals rather than
households (Van Parijs, 1992). Some proponents argue that a BI system should be
accompanied by widespread social security reform, including deregulation of the labour
market. For Atkinson (1995), the BI proposal, in its pure form, would replace all social
security benefits and it would be accompanied by a flat comprehensive income tax rate
that would replace the existing income taxes and social security contributions.
2 In this
way, proponents of BI hope to provide a solution to the “impossible trinity” of welfare
reform objectives: to raise the living standards of low-income families, to encourage
employment, and to keep budget costs low.                                                       
The second policy proposal involves the government paying employment subsidies to
firms (as advocated by Phelps (1997) and Solow (1998)). The direct aim of this policy is
not so much to increase worker’s income but to reduce the unemployment rate. It could,
nevertheless, indirectly help those remaining unemployed after the enactment of the
policy if it results in higher wage rates and unemployment benefits (if the replacement
ratio stays constant). 
The third policy we examine is more straightforward, in the sense that it does not
involve the government setting up an entirely new program. Instead, it involves simply
the lowering of the tax rate applied to labour income. 5
Throughout our analysis, we assume that all initiatives – basic income, employment
subsidies and household wage-income tax cuts – are financed by raising the tax on capital
– which is a perfectly mobile factor in the open-economy case. We make this financing
assumption, despite the fact that some proponents of BI expect this initiative to be
financed by cuts in existing social programs. We do so for two reasons. First, we want to
examine the possibility of redistribution – especially in an open economy setting. All
previous analyses of the effects of introducing BI have assumed that it will be “financed”
by cutting down on existing social security programs in a closed economy setting (see,
Bowles (1992), Atkinson (1995), Groot and Peters (1997), Van der Linden (1999, 2000)).
Second, we are concerned about political feasibility. In this respect we note that even
within the European Union, there are significant differences across countries in the
relative importance attached to redistributive social policy goals, in the instruments used,
and in the extent to which social policy achieves its intended effects.
3 The evolution of
the social welfare system in each country has created constituencies that strongly resist
any reductions in the benefits to which they have become "entitled." Even more
importantly, for many supporters of advanced European welfare states, the fully
developed welfare state deserves priority over BI because it is considered to accomplish
what BI can not: it guarantees that certain specific human needs will be met. It is argued
that although both the current advanced welfare states and BI can reduce inequality of
“condition,” the welfare state does so with greater efficiency because it takes better
account of inequalities due to differences in needs. For example, if person A needs
expensive medical treatment and person B does not, giving both of them a BI grant will
not go far to make their situations more equal; only the public provision of health6
services has the chance of accomplishing that (see, Bergmann (2001)). Thus, both to
respect this political feasibility constraint, and to address some of the concerns raised
about globalization, we consider financing all initiatives by taxing the "rich."         
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the
macro model that underlies the paper's conclusions. It is quite standard and highly
simplified. There are two factors of production: labour (which we think of as unskilled,
since the government wishes to raise workers' incomes), and "capital" (which we think of
as standing for both physical capital and skilled labour – the source of the human capital
that is also to be taxed). It is assumed that the owners of capital are the "rich". To the
extent that "capital" involves skilled workers, we make the assumption that these
individuals find their employment so rewarding that the possibility of reduced efficiency
and effort on the job does not arise. But with the less skilled who do not have "good"
jobs, it is assumed that these individuals are dissatisfied with their work. It is, therefore,
in firms' interest to pay efficiency wages to generate the profit-maximizing level of
labour productivity. We use Summers' (1988) compact exposition of efficiency wages to
specify this set up for the "labour" input in our model. All initiatives that are designed to
help labour are financed by taxing the owners of capital. In the closed-economy setting,
these "rich" individuals cannot migrate to escape this taxation; in the small open-
economy setting they can. 
In sections 3 and 4, the results for the closed-economy and small open-economy
versions of the model are explained. In sections 5 and 6, we consider a sensitivity test
(allowing unemployment to follow from unions instead of efficiency wages), we discuss
several possible extensions of the analysis, and we offer concluding remarks. 7
2. The Model 
There are two factors of production: labour (L) and capital (K). Since we think of
"labour" as unskilled and deserving of some government attention, and since it is more
difficult for such individuals to move great distances, we assume that labour is immobile
internationally. (We set L=1.) In contrast, in the open-economy setting, we assume that
capital can move in and out of the country without cost. 
Firms (correctly) believe that wages exert an influence on the productivity (effort)
of their workforce. Firms have an incentive to manipulate the wage offered to the
unskilled so that costs per efficiency unit of unskilled labour are minimized. As a result,
the wage rate exceeds the level that would clear the market, and this determines the
equilibrium unemployment rate for labour. Firms have no incentive to pay a similar
premium for capital. Thus, capital is paid its marginal product, and in the open-economy
case, capital mobility insures that the after-tax return is determined exogenously in the
rest of the world. 
We view the unemployment that emerges in an efficiency-wage setting as
"involuntary". This is why it is appropriate for the government to consider intervening
with a policy initiative. Efficiency wage theories are based on market failure – the
premise that employers cannot acquire full information about the productivity of their
workers (see, for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1986)). This proposition is reflected in
most employment contracts, since they do not involve precise specifications of
productivity. A higher wage offer by the firm may increase the average productivity of its
workforce for several reasons. First, a high-wage firm may (on average) attract workers
of higher quality. Second, a higher wage increases the magnitude of punishment incurred8
by a worker who is fired after being found offering a sub-standard amount of effort.
Third, high wages may lead workers to believe that they are treated “fairly”, and they
may reciprocate to this “gift” by offering higher effort. The implication of this
dependence of worker productivity on wages is that the firm will want to choose a wage
rate such that the marginal benefit from a wage increase is equated with the associated
increase in costs. Thus, the profit-maximizing wage rate chosen by firms is compatible
with involuntary unemployment. The unemployed may be willing to work at lower
wages, yet if firms employ them, marginal revenue would decline more than marginal
cost.
  The firms' production function is:
. ) (
1 γ γ bL K Y
− = (1)
γ is a positive fractions, and b is the index of work effort. We rely on a particularly
compact version of efficiency wages (due to Summers (1988) and highlighted by Romer
(2001)), which is compatible with any of the motivations mentioned above (and which is
more readily calibrated than the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984 ) specification - see Pissarides
(1998)). Following Summers, we specify b as:
. ] ) ) 1 ( [(
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The term in round brackets defines what individuals receive if they are working; x
denotes their alternative option that is available should they leave their current job. t is
the income tax rate applied to labour earnings, and p is a parameter that defines BI. This
parameter measures the generosity of an unconditional (and tax-free) transfer of income
from the government to all (unskilled) individuals – independent of employment status.
We assume that this BI (which is the same for all individuals) is proportional to the wage9
rate. α is a positive fraction; as a result, a higher wage in the current job raises each
worker’s return relative to her alternative, and thereby induces higher productivity. The
worker’s alternative option is defined as 
, ) 1 )( 1 ( pw ufw w t u x + + − − = (3)
where f is a parameter measuring the generosity of the unemployment-insurance system.
That is, benefits paid to the unemployed are a proportion (f) of the wage, and these
benefits are untaxed. The worker’s alternative option is a weighted average of the wage
offered at other firms (which equals w in full equilibrium) and what is received if the
individual cannot find work. The weights are the employment rate, (1-u), and the
unemployment rate, u, respectively. When firms optimize, they regard x as independent
of their individual wage and employment decisions.
Each firm’s profit function is: 
. ) ( rK L Q w Y − − − = π
r is the interest rate (the wage or rent paid to each unit of capital); as above, w is the wage
rate; and Q is a per-employee subsidy paid to the firm. We assume that Q is proportional
to the economy-wide wage rate, that is:  qw Q = . Nevertheless, when individual firms
optimize, they do not think of this equation holding at the individual level. That is, when
choosing w, firms do not think that the subsidy rate that they will receive depends on
their individual wage policy.
Setting the derivatives of the profit function with respect to w, L and K equal to
zero, manipulating the first-order conditions, and using the definition of x, we derive the
following relationships:
) 1 /( ) 1 )( 1 ( f t t q u − − − − =α (4)10
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Equation (4) states that the unemployment rate depends positively on the generosity of
unemployment insurance and the wage-income tax rate paid by workers, and negatively
on the subsidy rate paid to firms for employing individuals. Equation (5) states that the
marginal product of capital should be set equal to the rental cost of capital. In similar
fashion, equation (6) states that the marginal product of labour should be equal to its (net
of subsidy) rental rate (the pre-tax wage). 
In the open-economy setting, the assumption that capital is perfectly mobile
internationally implies that its after-tax reward is equal to what prevails in the rest of the
world. This implies that
r r = − ) 1 ( τ (7)
where  τ and r are the tax rate applied to capital rents, and the after-tax reward that can
be had by the owners of capital in the rest of the world. Equation (7) constrains the
government’s ability to redistribute income, since it implies that the “rich” stand ready to
withdraw their services to whichever degree is required to insulate their net returns from
any taxes imposed.
There is one additional limitation on the government’s use of fiscal incentives and
transfers – the fact that it must respect its budget constraint. A balanced budget is
stipulated in equation (8):
. ) 1 ( ) 1 ( rK u tw u qw pw fwu G τ + − = − + + + (8)
It states that spending on goods (G), unemployment insurance, unconditional income
transfers (the BI), and employment subsidies must equal the sum of the two forms of11
income tax revenue. Equation (8) involves the definition that individuals must be either
employed or unemployed:
. 1 u L − = (9)
The open-economy version of the model involves equations (1) through (9)
solving for Y, L, K, u, w, r, b, x and one government policy variable (which is p in the
case of BI, q in the case of employment subsidies, and t with the wage-income tax cut). In
each case, we impose an increase in the tax rate on capital, τ. In the closed-economy case,
equation (7) is dropped, and K becomes an exogenous variable. Proceeding with the
solution of the model, we first divide both sides of equation (8) by Y, define g = G/Y, k =
K/Y and use equation (6) to substitute out w/Y. Equation (8) becomes:
)]. ) 1 ( )[ 1 )( 1 ( )] 1 )( ( [ g q u u q t p fu − − − − = − − − + γ τ γ (8a)
To derive policy effects, we take the total differential of the system, and then simplify the
coefficients of the resulting system (that relates the changes in all variables) in two ways.
First, we evaluate the coefficients subject to the restrictions implied by the initial full
equilibrium. Second, we set the initial values of BI (p) and the employment subsidy (q)
equal to zero, and the initial value of Y to unity. We focus on four effects that follow from
each policy initiative – the effects on: the unemployment rate (u), the level of
productivity (b), the expected income of each individual (who undergoes periods of
employment and unemployment, x), and (in the closed economy only) the income of
capitalists (v). The percentage change in expected labour income is given by:  
dp df u du f t dt u w dw x dx ) / 1 ( ) / ( ) / ) 1 (( ) / ) 1 (( ) / ( ) / ( ψ ψ ψ ψ + + − − − − − =
where , ) 1 )( 1 ( p uf u t + + − − = ψ
and the percentage change of the income of capitalists (in a closed economy) is given by:12
. )) 1 /( 1 ( ) / ( ) / ( τ τ d Y dY v dv − − =
Recall that the incomes of the owners of capital are unaffected in the small open
economy (given equation (7)).
The formal results are summarized in the appendix. The discussion in the
following sections of the text is limited to verbal and graphic analyses. 
3. A Closed Economy
The most convenient way of appreciating the results in the closed-economy case
is by considering Figure 1. This diagram shows the perfectly inelastic supply curve for
capital, and the downward sloping marginal product of (demand for) capital curve. The
position of the demand curve is affected by the quantity of effective labour, bL. For
example, an increase in bL increases the marginal product schedule for capital (as shown
by the dashed demand curve in Figure 1). Initially, before any such shift, the economy’s
outcome is given by the intersection of the solid demand and supply curves. Total output
(Y) is given by the sum of three areas (numbered 1 through 3). Capital owners receive a
total income equal to the area of regions 1 and 2, while labour receives a pre-tax-and-
transfer level of income equal to region 3.
Now consider the introduction in BI. Since this policy is independent of each
individual's employment status, there are no incentive effects. As a result, labour
productivity, the unemployment rate, and the wage rate are all unaffected. There is a
zero-sum outcome since capital owners are captive. They pay more taxes, and exactly
this total is transferred to workers and the unemployed. All that happens in Figure 1 is
that an amount of income equal to region 2 is transferred to the workers/unemployed.13
This policy cannot be recommended on the basis of the hypothetical compensation
principle, since – if the winners compensated the losers – there would be precisely
nothing left over.
A more discouraging result emerges with employment subsidies. This policy does
involve incentive effects, so – at first glance – it would seem to be recommended. Firms
respond by increasing employment and paying higher wages, and – together – these
developments raise the expected income of each individual (variable x). But there are
competing effects on the level of labour productivity. Worker effort is increased by the
higher wage rate, but it is decreased by the increased probability that the unemployed can
find a job. As proved in the appendix, the latter effect must dominate, so productivity
falls. There are competing effects on the overall level of GDP as well, and the value of
the formal model is that it allows us to evaluate which effect is stronger. Total output is
pushed up by the fact more people are working, but total output is pulled down by the
reduction in productivity. Again, as proved in the appendix, the lower productivity effect
must dominate. In terms of Figure 1, this means that the marginal product of capital curve
shifts down, so that total output (represented by the area under that marginal product
schedule) falls. In other words, this initiative generates a negative-sum outcome. The
winners (labour) cannot compensate the losers (capital) even if they transfer their entire
winnings. By the hypothetical compensation criterion, then, this policy is not
recommended.
Finally, consider a cut in the wage-income tax rate financed by a higher tax on
capital. Since this policy raises the relative return individuals receive from employment,
its direct effect is to push up productivity. This makes it sensible for firms to cut the wage14
premium they had been offering to stimulate productivity, and with lower wages, the
unemployment rate falls. It is proved in the appendix that productivity must increase –
despite the fact that lower pre-tax wages and lower unemployment both push productivity
in the opposite direction. The dominant influence is the fact that the lower tax rate makes
the after-tax wage higher. In terms of Figure 1, the marginal product curve for capital
shifts up since both b and L are higher. Total output is now the sum of areas 1, 2, 3 and 4.
With this increase in overall product, the winners can compensate the losers and still have
something left over. So, according to the hypothetical compensation principle, this policy
is recommended. However, this criterion is unappealing since there is no way for the
government to perform this transfer back to capitalists without simply reversing the
original initiative. 
We conclude that none of the policies represent a Paretian improvement. Thus,
according to this model, we should expect resistance to all these policies on the part of
the owners of capital. One might expect that the support for these initiatives could be
even more limited in the open-economy case, since – in this case – capitalists can protect
themselves by migrating away from the higher tax, leaving workers to operate with a
lower quantity of capital. We see in the next section, however, that the analysis does not
support this conjecture concerning decreased support. 
4. The Open Economy
The open-economy results are illustrated in Figure 2. In this case, the supply
curve for capital is perfectly elastic. There is no change on the demand side of the model,
so the downward sloping marginal product relationship appears as in Figure 1, and (as15
before) its position is affected by bL.  Before any of the policy initiatives, the economy’s
outcome is given by the intersection of the solid demand and supply curves, and total
output (Y) is given by the sum of seven areas (numbered 1 through 7). Capital owners get
regions 1, 2 and 3, while labour gets regions 4 through 7. 
Before focusing on the model's results, let us use Figure 2 to review the standard
analysis of why taxing elastically supplied capital is not recommended. That standard
setting involves a competitive labour market (so parameter b is unity), and a fixed labour
supply (so L is unity). As a result, there is no mechanism that permits a shift in the
position of the capital demand function. When the government raises the tax on capital,
the higher (dashed) supply curve becomes relevant. Domestically produced output falls
by the sum of regions 1, 2, 4 and 5. Capital owners do not lose regions 1 and 2, since they
now earn this income in the rest of the world. Labour loses regions 4, 5 and 6, but if the
revenue is used to make a transfer to labour, their net loss is just the sum of regions 4 and
5. But this is a loss, so capital is a bad thing to tax.  
But if there is a pre-existing distortion, capital can be a good thing to tax. Before
illustrating this proposition in Figure 2, we review the original article on the second best
(see, Lipsey and Lancaster (1956)). One example discussed in that seminal paper
concerned sales taxes in a two-good world. With perfect competition, a tax on just good 2
is not recommended, since this levy makes that price exceed marginal cost, and there is
no similar wedge in the other market. But if there is market failure in the first place (say
in the form of a monopolist producing good 1), the tax on good 2 can make sense. Now a
sales tax on the competitive sector can raise that good’s price-to-marginal-cost ratio to
what prevails in the monopoly sector, and a selective excise tax is optimal after all. The16
tax in the second sector fixes the initial problem – that the output of good 1 is too small.
Figure 2 illustrates a similar situation involving two factors, instead of two goods. 
With asymmetric information, the employment of factor 1 (labour) is too small in
the second best starting point. A tax on capital induces firms to shift more toward
employing labour and that helps lessen the initial distortion. But can this desirable effect
of the tax outweigh the traditional excess-burden cost (the loss of income represented by
regions 4 and 5 in Figure 2). It appears that this possible. For instance, if the government
uses the tax revenue in a way that induces higher labour productivity and/or lower
unemployment, the higher b and L values would shift up the marginal product of capital
curve in Figure 2. The new outcome is given by the intersection of the dashed demand
and supply curves. Total income available to labour is affected in two ways. It is reduced
by region 4 (as usual) and it is increased by region 8. The two questions of interest are:
Can we identify a use of the tax revenue that leads to the marginal product curve shifting
up, not down? and Can we identify a circumstance in which region 8 can be bigger than
region 4?
With this intuitive background in place, let us now consider each policy in turn.
We begin with BI. As is evident from Figure 2, the financing of BI raises the cost of
capital to firms, and it induces them to set a lower wage rate. In this efficiency-wage
setting, lower wages lead to lower productivity, so this policy lowers b, and the demand
for capital curve shifts down, not up. As a result, the total income available for labour
shrinks, and this is why average labour income (x) falls. So, with capitalists unaffected
and labour losing, BI is not supported by this analysis.17
The analysis is a little more complicated with employment subsidies, since there
are two reasons for the marginal product of capital schedule to shift – both b and L adjust.
The reduction in unemployment has both favourable and unfavourable effects. The direct
(favourable) outcome is that it increases the marginal product of capital, but the indirect
(unfavourable) outcome is that (other things equal) increased job prospects and lower
wages (as explained above) lead to lower labour productivity (a lower value for b). It is
proved in the appendix that this downward pressure on b must be the dominant
consideration, so that both wages (w) and the average labour income (x) must fall. As
with BI, then, the demand for capital curve (in Figure 2) shifts down, and the total
income available for labour falls. Employment subsidies are not supported by the
analysis.   
Finally, we consider the balanced budget tax substitution – increasing the tax on
capital to finance a tax cut for labour. As with the employment subsidy, unemployment
falls, but in this case there are competing effects on labour productivity. As before,
increased job prospects lead to decreased work effort, but in this case, the lower tax on
employment earnings stimulates increased work effort. It is proved in the appendix that
this favourable effect must dominate, so that the work effort index, parameter b, rises.
With both b and L rising, we finally have an initiative that shifts the marginal product of
capital schedule up, as shown in Figure 2. 
As noted above, for it to be possible for this tax substitution to represent a
Paretian improvement, we must establish that region 8 in Figure 2 can be larger than
region 4. As explained in the appendix, an appeal to illustrative parameter values is
required to make this case. Up to this point, there have been some ambiguities in some of18
the formal multipliers that are reported in the appendix, but in all cases these
uncertainties are resolved by appealing to three simple conditions. A sufficient – though
not necessary – set of conditions for all results reported thus far is that the initial
unemployment rate be smaller than the replacement rate parameter in the unemployment
insurance system, and that this, in turn, be smaller than one minus the initial tax rates:
). 1 ( ) 1 ( τ − = − < < t f u
Since these restrictions are not remotely controversial, we are confident of all results that
have been reported. However, to establish the effect on average labour income in this
open-economy tax-substitution case, we need to consult illustrative parameter values in a
more detailed fashion.  
We have considered many sets of representative parameter values, and the results
are unaffected by this sensitivity testing. Our baseline parameter assumptions are as
follows: u = .12 and  33 . 0 = = = = γ τ t f . These values are based on the assumption that
broadly defined capital (which we think of as including skilled labour) receives an
income share of 2/3 (as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)). Since the model involves
the assumption that skilled individuals are fully employed, the u = .12 assumption implies
that the nation's overall unemployment rate is 6 percent if (initially) there are equal
numbers of skilled and unskilled individuals. Readers can readily verify that this is one
set of parameter values that involves both average labour income, x, and work effort, b,
rising with this balanced budget tax substitution (despite the fact that wages, w, fall).
Since capitalists are unaffected by this initiative, and since labour is helped – both in
terms of lower unemployment and in terms of higher average income – we conclude that19
the analysis supports this policy. It permits income redistribution in a globalized setting,
and it requires no new government administration.
To allow readers to have some feel for the possible magnitudes involved with all
policies, we note the following implications of the baseline parameter values. If the tax
on capital rises by 10% (by 0.033), x falls by 1.3% with BI; x  falls by 1.2% with
employment subsidies; and x rises by 0.9% with the tax cut for labour. The
unemployment rate is unaffected by BI; it falls from 12.0% to 10.8% with the
employment subsidy; and it falls to 10.7% with the tax cut for labour.
Finally, it is useful to summarize the differences between the closed and open-
economy analyses. There is some support for those concerned about the proposition that
globalization may make low-income support more difficult. As we move to the global
case, both BI and employment subsidies shift from being policies that help labour to ones
that hurt labour. Also, in the case of BI, the effect of the policy on overall output shifts
from one that involves no change to one that reduces the size of the overall economic
"pie". But the outcome is different for the wage-income tax cut. Labour wins in both
settings, and the overall economic "pie" grows in both cases. But, since there is no
political economy problem (no compensation required) in the open-economy case, this
policy receives stronger support in the global setting. We conclude that the analysis
provides at least a partial response to anti-globalization protesters, since it shows that the
scope for at least one low income support policy can be increased by globalization. 
As noted in the paper's introduction, we have been heavily influenced by the
challenge posed by globalization – does a small open economy have sufficient degrees of
freedom to perform meaningful income redistribution? We are drawn to this focus20
because, over time, the assumption of perfect mobility for both capital and skilled labour
may become ever more relevant. Since no studies of BI and employment subsidies have
focused on the small open-economy constraint, we felt that it was important to start
filling at least part of this gap. We conclude that globalization does pose a threat to the
efficacy of these policies, but that there is a substitute initiative that appears to be less
limited by these constraints. 
We close this section by reiterating the intuition that lies behind the support we
have found for the tax substitution policy. With an asymmetric information problem and
market failure in the labour market (and only one other factor – capital), the optimal tax
on capital is no longer zero. Even though capital is supplied elastically, and (therefore)
this tax distorts, it permits a lower tax to be paid by labour. This decreases the difference
between the net wages of the employed and the income received by those out of work,
and this reduces unemployment and increases overall consumption possibilities. This
conclusion – that it may make sense to tax internationally mobile capital – is similar to
the one derived by Koskela and Schob (2000) in the context of optimal factor income
taxation. They note that, in the presence of involuntary unemployment, labour supply is
locally infinitely elastic. Thus, the inverse elasticity rule suggests that labour should not
be taxed at a higher rate than capital (whose supply is also infinitely elastic at the world
rate of interest). Moreover, the presence of unemployment due to the wage rate being
higher than the competitive one implies that the private marginal cost of labour is higher
than its social marginal cost. Thus, welfare can be increased by taxing the labour input
less heavily relative to the capital input (whose social marginal cost equals the world
interest rate).
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It must be admitted that our model does not address the concern that fiscal
competition among countries in a world of mobile capital might eliminate the tax on
capital as an option (see, for example, Edwards and Keen (1996) and Sinn (1994)). A
similar point – applied to mobile skilled labour – is made by Wildasin (1991). But
Kessler, Lulfesmann and Myers (2000) have considered mobile capital and labour
together. In this setting, fiscal competition is lessened. When redistribution is pursued in
one country, the immigration of labour raises the tax base and decreases the incentive to
attract capital. Kessler, Lulfesmann and Myers identify circumstances in which increased
redistribution in one country makes the majority of the population in both countries (in
their two-county model) strictly better off. We conclude that fiscal competition may not
undermine the applicability of analyses such as ours after all.
5. Specification Issues
In this section, we address two questions – an alternative rationale for
unemployment, and issues surrounding the specification for labour supply. 
Since there is controversy concerning how best to model unemployment, we
consider an alternative to efficiency-wage theory. In particular, in Europe, the role of
unions in pushing the wage above market clearing levels is often stressed. Pissarides
(1998, p. 162) outlines a compact specification of the interaction between unions and
firms. It involves firms choosing employment after the wage is set as a result of a Nash
bargaining process. If individuals are risk neutral, and the production process is Cobb-
Douglas, Pissarides shows that the closed-form solution for the unemployment rate is
precisely our equation (4) above. In this case, parameter α is defined differently:22
)), 1 ( /( )) 1 ( ( ε γ γ ε α − − =  where, as above, γ is labour's exponent in the production
function, and ε is labour's bargaining power parameter in the Nash-product involved in
the theory of wage setting. (This parameter determines the share of the surplus resulting
from the employment relationship that goes to workers.) The only other changes in the
model are that, with unions instead of efficiency wages, parameter b is unity and the
exponent for capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function is specified as β, where
, 1 < + β γ  since there must be a surplus to be bargained over. 
With the structure of the model almost identical, it is not surprising that many of
the results (and the intuition provided by Figures 1 and 2) are the same as what have been
explained above. The major difference is that there is an implicit third factor – which we
can think of as the entrepreneurs – receiving income equal to  . ) 1 ( Y β γ − −  For the surplus
that is bargained over to remain in full equilibrium, we have to assume that the
entrepreneurs are not mobile internationally. Thus, we are forced to treat the
entrepreneurs in a group along with the (unskilled) workers. This is unappealing since
there is not the same public concern about entrepreneurs. Thus, while our results are very
similar with unions replacing the efficiency-wage specification (and our analysis
therefore passes this sensitivity test), we prefer the efficiency-wage model on motivation
grounds. 
  We now discuss our specification of labour supply. In effect, we assume that
labour force participation is independent of the policy changes that are examined. This
may seem especially controversial in the case of basic income, since some proponents
stress possible differences between BI and other forms of income support on this front.23
As a result, we provide a brief review of the empirical literature concerning the impact of
income taxation on work incentives. 
The empirical literature on labour supply has identified two margins in which
labour supply can respond. First, there is the response along the intensive margin. That is,
individuals can vary their hours or effort intensity on the job. If leisure is a normal good,
the income and substitution effects of tax changes work in opposite directions. The
empirical literature has been at pains to establish the size of the net effect. Killingsworth
(1983), Burtless (1986) and Blundell (1992) conclude that the evidence suggests a labour
supply elasticity far closer to 0 than to 1.  
Second, individuals may respond along the extensive margin; that is, they decide
whether or not to enter the labour force. With respect to the extensive margin, the
Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) policies
in the United States have provided most of the evidence. It is well established that,
relative to a NIT program, incentives to work are enhanced with an EITC because the
implicit tax rate inherent in the latter program is smaller. Nevertheless, some authors (for
example, Browning (1995) and Eissa and Hoynes (1998)) have still pointed to some
problems regarding the incentive structure of the EITC. A major concern in this respect is
that the EITC is effectively subsidizing married mothers to stay at home (while it has
only a small positive effect on married men’s labour supply). Eissa and Hoynes (1998)
suggest that a possible reform of the EITC (that it be based on individual earnings as
opposed to family earnings) would offset the incentives for secondary earners to leave the
labour force. Since the BI proposal provides support to working age individuals (rather
than families), it should be less prone to causing reductions in participation rates. This24
consideration, when taken together with the small effects identified by Eissa and Hoynes,
lead us to regard the assumption of no effect of BI on aggregate labour force participation
as a reasonable approximation of reality. 
6. Conclusions   
Our analysis of basic income and employment subsidies has drawn attention to
some of the complications that follow from the financing of these initiatives. Even in a
closed-economy setting, the analysis identifies political economy questions concerning
how such policies can achieve support when segments of the population suffer income
losses. The analysis indicates that these concerns are increased in the open-economy
setting, where those who are taxed have an increased ability to avoid any loss in income.
Nevertheless, we have stressed that in a second-best initial situation, Paretian
improvements are possible. Further, a balanced budget tax substitution was identified as
one initiative that could thereby avoid any political economy support problem – even in a
global setting. We think that the identification of this possibility should allay some of the
fears of those who think that globalization may weaken our ability to effect low-income
support policy in a small economy. The analysis suggests that more research on tax
substitutions of this sort may bring at least as big a return as will further analysis of basic
income and employment subsidies. 
In related work, we have begun some of this additional investigation. We are
considering a specification of technology that allows for an explicit difference between
skilled labour and physical capital (with the former being essential in the production
process). Also, we allow the skilled individuals to save (so that their consumption and25
income are not identical, and so that the analysis allows for the effects of each policy
initiative on long-run wealth accumulation). Preliminary results suggest that some of
these changes in model specification can increase the support for basic income and/or
employment subsidies. We hope that the present paper stimulates others to work on
extensions such as this one. 
Of course, even with extensions, it may not be possible to incorporate within the
analysis all aspects of the debate concerning basic income and employment subsidies. For
example, proponents of BI stress issues such as its beneficial effects on the level of real
freedom for disadvantaged groups, while some opponents stress self-sufficiency and the
value people derive from making a contribution through employment. These wider
philosophical issues are well summarized in the debate between Phelps (2000) and Van
Parijs (2000) in the Boston Review. Some of these wider issues can be included in an
extended version of our analysis. One relates to the encouragement of work sharing, and
a second to reductions in administrative costs. (BI would do away with complicated
means-tested benefits.) Another issue stressed by proponents of the BI is that – when it
replaces unemployment insurance – it offers incentives for skill acquisition. It remains to
be explored how BI may affect behaviour if it also replaces a public pension system.
Nevertheless, our work in progress involving a formal skilled-unskilled distinction and
long-run wealth accumulation are designed to allow theses issues to be explored. In the
meantime, it is hoped that the present paper has clarified some of the basic
macroeconomic trade-offs involved with the provision of basic income and employment
subsidies.26
Appendix
For the closed economy, the policy results are as follows.
With BI,  . 0 ) / / ( / ) / ( / ) / ( / = = = = τ τ τ τ d Y dY d b db d w dw d du
Also, 0 )) 1 /( 1 / ) / ( < − − = τ τ d v dv , and  . 0 ) /( )] 1 )( 1 [( ) / ( > − − = γψ γ τ u d x dx
With the employment subsidy, 
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With the wage-income tax cut, 
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Not all the signs reported are certain a priori. Nevertheless, as noted in the text,
sufficient - though not necessary - conditions for all but the very last result are:
). 1 ( ) 1 ( τ − = − < < t f u27
Since these restrictions are not at all controversial, we can be confident of the signs that
are reported. 
For the small open economy, the policy results are as follows (a ^ over a variable
denotes proportional change).
With BI,
0 / = τ d du
0 )) 1 )( 1 ( /( ) 1 ( / ˆ < − − − − = α τ γ γ τ d w
0 ) ) 1 )( 1 /(( )) 1 ( ( / ˆ < − − − − = γ α τ γ α τ d b
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With the employment subsidy, 
0 / )) 1 )( 1 ( ( / < − − − = γλ γ τ u u d du
0 ) ) 1 ( /( ))] 1 /( ( ) 1 )( 1 )[( 1 ( / ˆ < − − − − − − = λ α γ τ λ α γ τ u d w
The x response is calculated from these component multipliers (as in earlier cases). The
result is unsigned. Nevertheless, we have experimented with many parameter values, and
the results are unaffected. Readers may wish to use our baseline parameter assumptions:
(noted in the text) to verify that, for representative parameter assumptions, x falls with the
introduction of employment subsidies. 
With the wage-income tax cut,
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1 Some economists have pointed to alternative explanations, such as  a shift in relative
demand in favour of skilled labour. Others, for example, Gordon (1996), has argued that
the weakening of labour market institutions and the erosion of the real value of the
minimum wage are responsible for the increased inequality in the United States.
2The BI proposal, although it can be traced as far back as Augustin Cournot and John
Stuart Mill, must be seen in tandem with the current policy trend in many OECD
countries to “make work pay”. By conferring tax credits and benefits to employees,
policy makers in many countries attempt to increase employment and net incomes of
low-wage earners without imposing too large a burden on the state’s budget (e.g. the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US, the Child Tax Benefit in Canada and the
Working Families’ Tax Credit in the UK).  Nevertheless, the measures implemented do
not aim at guaranteeing a subsistence level. All these programs are conditional on
employment, and the level of the implied subsidy is inversely related to the income (or
hours of work) of the recipients. To the proponents of BI, this is the Achilles’ heel of
these programs, since the implied marginal tax rate for households in the phase-out range
of these programs can be as high as 80 percent (see, Brewer and Gregg (2001)).
3 Following Esping-Andersen (1990) we can identify four “models of welfare capitalism”
in the EU: the Scandinavian model of universal social protection as a right of citizenship;
the ‘Bismarckian’ employment-based model of Germany, Austria, France and the
Benelux countries; the Anglo-Saxon model of the United Kingdom and Ireland; and the
fragmented and highly idiosyncratic arrangements of the remaining southern EU
members. Also, Heady, Mitrakos and Tsakloglou (2001) document the very large
variance of social transfers in the EU. Social transfers as a percentage of GDP vary
between 16.9% (Portugal) to 37.6%  (Sweden). Wide differences also exist in the
allocation of such transfers by type of benefit ( for example, family related benefits
account for 0.7% of total social transfers in Spain and for 15.2% in Ireland), by their
impact on inequality ( the proportional decline in the Gini index of inequality due to
social tranfers in cash varies between 46% for Denmark and 22.7% for Portugal),  and in
poverty (the existence of unemployment benefits reduces poverty by 66.4% in Denmark
and by 1.7% in Greece).
4 Others (such as Manning (1995) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)) have shown that – in
such a second-best setting – other non-standard results can emerge. For example, in their
efficiency-wage models, minimum wage laws can raise employment. We have verified
that this is not possible in Summers’ version of efficiency wage theory that we rely on in
this paper.CESifo Working Paper Series
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